Seventh Circuit Holds That Bankruptcy Trustee\u27s  Strong-Arm  Powers Not Strong Enough for the IRS by Geske, Paul T.
Seventh Circuit Review 
Volume 10 Issue 1 Article 2 
9-1-2014 
Seventh Circuit Holds That Bankruptcy Trustee's "Strong-Arm" 
Powers Not Strong Enough for the IRS 
Paul T. Geske 
IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Paul T. Geske, Seventh Circuit Holds That Bankruptcy Trustee's "Strong-Arm" Powers Not Strong Enough 
for the IRS, 10 Seventh Circuit Rev. 1 (2014). 
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol10/iss1/2 
This Bankruptcy Law is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College 
of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Seventh Circuit Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons 
@ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact jwenger@kentlaw.iit.edu, 
ebarney@kentlaw.iit.edu. 
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                        Volume 10, Issue 1                            Fall 2014 
 
1 
SEVENTH CIRCUIT HOLDS THAT BANKRUPTCY 
TRUSTEE’S “STRONG-ARM” POWERS ARE NOT 







Cite as: Paul T. Geske, Seventh Circuit Holds That Bankruptcy Trustee’s “Strong-
Arm” Powers Are Not Strong Enough for the IRS, 10 SEVENTH CIRCUIT REV. 1 






In the 2014 case In re Equipment Acquisition Resources, Inc.,
1
 the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit became the first federal 
circuit court to hold that bankruptcy trustees cannot use the “strong-
arm” powers of 11 U.S.C.A. 544(b)
2
 to avoid a fraudulent transfer 
where the transferee is the federal government.
3
 More specifically, the 
Seventh Circuit held that the doctrine of sovereign immunity makes it 
impossible for the trustee to satisfy the requirements of Section 544(b) 
in actions against a federal government entity.
4
 This holding is 
counterintuitive, because another provision of the Bankruptcy Code, 
Section 106(a)(1), abrogates federal sovereign immunity as to Section 
544.
5
 The interplay of these two Code
6
 sections is nuanced, and the 
                                                 
 J.D. candidate, May 2015, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology. 
1
 In re Equip. Acquisition Res., Inc., 742 F.3d 743 (7th Cir. 2014). 
2
 11 U.S.C.A. § 544(b) (West 2014). 
3




 11 U.S.C.A. § 106. 
1
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2 
Seventh Circuit’s opinion creates some tension between the two 
provisions. 
Equipment Acquisition Resources is important, not just because it 
is controversial, but also because it goes to the heart of how courts 
construe statutes. The Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Equipment 
Acquisition Resources and the opinions of prior courts on the same 
issue demonstrate what courts value when construing statutes, and 
how those values promote or obstruct bankruptcy policy. Additionally, 
the Seventh Circuit’s discussion of sovereign immunity is instructive 
as to how courts view the relationship between individuals and the 
government. Even so, the Seventh Circuit’s approach and its ultimate 
holding are vulnerable to criticism on several grounds. 
In its opinion, the Seventh Circuit stated that it was simply 
interpreting Sections 544(b) and 106(a) according to their plain 
meaning.
7
 However, this approach fails to acknowledge that there are 
other legitimate interpretations of the provisions’ supposedly plain 
meaning, as every court to have confronted this issue prior to 
Equipment Acquisition Resources has disagreed with the Seventh 
Circuit. Also, the Seventh Circuit’s holding renders Section 106(a)—
the section waiving sovereign immunity—partially meaningless. If, as 
the Seventh Circuit held, 544(b) cannot avoid transfers to federal 
government entities with sovereign immunity, then why did Congress 
decide to abrogate sovereign immunity with regard to all of Section 
544? Further, the policy grounds on which the Seventh Circuit’s 
decision rests are hollow and speculative, and contrary to traditional 
bankruptcy objectives. The court’s decision should therefore be 
overruled, and not followed in other circuits. 
Part I of this article begins by briefly discussing the source of the 
bankruptcy trustee’s strong-arm powers in the Bankruptcy Code. Part 
II examines the factual and procedural background of Equipment 
Acquisition Resources. Part III then analyzes the Seventh Circuit’s 
opinion in Equipment Acquisition Resources alongside the other 
                                                                                                                   
6
 Unless otherwise stated, all references to the “Code” or to a “Section” refer to 
the Bankruptcy Code contained in Title 11 of the United States Code. 
7
 Equip. Acquisition Res., 742 F.3d at 747. 
2
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3 
district court cases that have addressed the same issue. Part IV 
assesses the strength of the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning, and argues 




Understanding the holding of Equipment Acquisition Resources 
requires some background knowledge, including a familiarity with the 
legal doctrines and Bankruptcy Code provisions that form the 
framework of the case. This first Part briefly explains the law on the 
central issue in Equipment Acquisition Resources, and then discusses 
the holdings of other courts that have addressed the same question.  
 
A. Bankruptcy Code Provisions 
 
1. Section 544(b): The Strong-Arm Powers 
 
Section 544(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, commonly referred to as 
the source of the “strong-arm” powers,
8
 is one of the most important 
tools in the bankruptcy trustee’s tool-belt. Broadly speaking, this 
section gives the trustee the power to avoid a fraudulent transfer by the 
debtor, if the transfer would be voidable by one of the debtor’s 
creditors under state law.
9
 In other words, Section 544(b) empowers 
the trustee by allowing him or her to exercise the rights that creditors 
of the debtor have under state fraudulent transfer law.
10
 After 
avoidance, the trustee can then claw back, or recover, the transferred 




                                                 
8
 See, e.g., Leibowitz v. Parkway Bank & Trust Co. (In re Image Worldwide, 
Ltd.), 139 F.3d 574, 576-77 (7th Cir. 1998); In re Munford, Inc., 98 F.3d 604, 609 
(11th Cir. 1996) (“Section 544(b) is commonly referred to as the ‘strong arm’ 
clause.”). 
9
 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 544.06(2) (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. 




 11 U.S.C.A. § 550(a). 
3
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4 
Turning first to the language of Section 544(b)(1), the provision 
states, in relevant part, that “the trustee may avoid any transfer of an 
interest of the debtor in property or any obligation incurred by the 
debtor that is voidable under applicable law by a creditor holding an 
unsecured claim . . . .”
12
 The “applicable law” referred to in 544(b)(1) 
is non-bankruptcy, state law.
13
 And most often, the state statute the 
trustee invokes is some form of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act 
(“UFTA”), which has been adopted by the legislatures of 43 states.
14
 
In sum, 544(b)(1) effectively “allows the trustee to use the applicable 




There are some important limitations on the trustee’s ability to 
invoke state fraudulent transfer law through Section 544(b). First, the 
trustee’s rights are no greater than those of a creditor acting under state 
law.
16
 It is often said that the trustee steps into the shoes of the 
creditor. Courts have explained this limitation as follows: 
 
It is well established that the effect of this section is to 
clothe the trustee with no new or additional right in the 
premises over that possessed by a creditor, but simply 
puts him in the shoes of the latter, and subject to the 
same limitations and disabilities that would have beset 
the creditor in the prosecution of the action on his own 
behalf; and the rights of the parties are to be 
determined, not by any provision of the Bankruptcy 
Act, but by the applicable principles of the common 
law, or the laws of the state in which the right of action 
                                                 
12
 Id. § 544(b). 
13
 See, e.g., Kittay v. Korf (In re Palermo), 739 F.3d 99, 101-02 (2d Cir. 2014); 
Sherwood Partners, Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 394 F.3d 1198, 1201 (9th Cir. 2005); In re 
Valley Mortgage, Inc., No. 10–19101–SBB, 2013 WL 5314369, at *1 (Bankr. D. 
Colo. 2013) (“Generally, ‘applicable law’ is interpreted to include state law causes 
of action”). 
14
 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 544.06(2). 
15
 In re Xonics Photochemical, Inc., 841 F.2d 198, 202 (7th Cir. 1988). 
16
  5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 544.06(3). 
4
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5 
may arise. In other words, the Bankruptcy Act merely 
permits the trustee to assert the rights which the 
creditor could assert but for the pendency of the 
bankruptcy proceedings, and if, for any reason arising 
under the laws of the state, the action could not be 





Because the trustee can only act to the extent that a creditor of the 
debtor could act under state law, bankruptcy courts look to state law in 
defining the properties and limits of the trustee’s strong-arm powers.
18
 
Accordingly, in Section 544(b) avoidance actions, the court focuses on 




Another important limitation on the trustee’s strong-arm powers is 
the requirement that some creditor actually exist who could bring a 
claim under the state’s fraudulent transfer law.
20
 This “actual creditor” 
requirement is derived from the language of 544(b). The trustee or 
debtor in possession must plead the existence of a creditor who could 
                                                 
17
 Davis v. Willey (In re Willey) 263 F. 588, 589 (N.D. Cal. 1920). The Davis 
court was actually describing the statute that preceded Section 544, because the 
present Bankruptcy Code did not exist in 1920. Nonetheless, the predecessor to 
Section 544 was functionally equivalent to the current version.  
18
 See, e.g., In re Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 483 B.R. 855, 862-63 (Bankr. 
E.D. Wis. 2012) (“The trustee's rights under § 544(b) are limited to the ‘rights of an 
existing unsecured creditor because § 544(b) rights are completely derivative of 
those of an actual unsecured creditor.’ Further, the trustee will be able to attack the 
transfer only to the extent a creditor with an allowable claim can avoid the transfer 
under applicable state law.”) (internal citations omitted); In re Fleming Packaging 
Corp., No. 03–82408, 2007 WL 1021884, at *9 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2007) (“When 
bringing an avoidance action under Section 544(b) . . . the extent of the trustee's 
rights is determined entirely by state law.”). 
19
 See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
20
 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 544.06(1) (“If there are no creditors against 
whom the transfer is voidable under the applicable law, the trustee is powerless to 
act under section 544(b)(1).”). 
5
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6 
have avoided the transfer at issue.
21
 That creditor must have been in 
existence when the purported fraudulent transfer took place and on the 
date of the bankruptcy filing.
22
 The creditor’s claim against the debtor 
also must be one which would be allowed in bankruptcy.
23
 Courts and 
commentators sometimes refer to this creditor as the “golden creditor,” 
because it is a lynchpin of Section 544(b) analysis.
24
 However, courts 
generally do not require the trustee to specifically name or rely on one 
particular creditor.
25
 As discussed below, the actual creditor 





2. Reach-back Period 
 
In addition to Section 544, there is another primary means for 
avoiding fraudulent transfers under the Bankruptcy Code: Section 
548.
27
 Whereas Section 544 is the source of the trustee’s state law 
avoidance powers, Section 548 is the source of the trustee’s 
bankruptcy law fraudulent transfer avoidance powers. Section 548 
mirrors state fraudulent transfer law, bringing the Bankruptcy Code 
into agreement with state law.
28
  
However, sections 544 and 548 differ in at least one important 
way. Section 548 has a shorter, two-year reach-back period; in other 
words, the trustee may only avoid transfers “made or incurred on or 
                                                 
21
 Leibowitz v. Parkway Bank & Trust Co. (In re Image Worldwide, Ltd.), 139 
F.3d 574, 577 (7th Cir. 1998); In re Leonard, 125 F.3d 543, 544 (7th Cir. 1997). 
22
 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 544.06(1).  
23
 Id. The law as to allowance of claims is outside the scope of this article, but 
it is sufficient to note that allowance is an additional requirement to establish 
standing under Section 544(b). 
24
 See, e.g., Faulkner v. Kornman (In re The Heritage Org., L.L.C.), 413 B.R. 
438, 459 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2009); Turner v. Phoenix Fin., LLC (In re Imageset, 
Inc.), 299 B.R. 709, 715 (Bankr. D. Me. 2003).  
25
 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 544.06(1). 
26
 See infra, Part III.A. 
27
 11 U.S.C.A. § 548 (West 2014). 
28
 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 548.01. 
6
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7 
within 2 years before the date of the filing of the petition.”
29
 
Conversely, state fraudulent transfer law, namely the UFTA, has a 
four-year reach-back period.
30
 Therefore, the Section 544 strong-arm 
powers are an essential tool for avoidance because they give the 
trustee access to the longer reach-back period under state law, and the 
ability to avoid transfers that the trustee otherwise could not avoid 




3. Section 106(a): The Bankruptcy Code’s Abrogation of Sovereign 
Immunity 
 
Sovereign immunity is a primordial common law doctrine which 
bars suit against sovereign entities.
32
 Immunity from suit is an attribute 
that is “inherent in the nature of sovereignty . . . .”
33
 Thus, the states 
and federal government are “not to be amenable to the suit of an 
individual without [their] consent.”
34
 The American legal system 
                                                 
29
 § 548(a)(1). 
30
 UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 9 (“A [claim for relief] [cause of 
action] with respect to a fraudulent transfer or obligation under this [Act] is 
extinguished unless action is brought: (a) under Section 4(a)(1), within 4 years after 
the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred or, if later, within one year 
after the transfer or obligation was or could reasonably have been discovered by the 
claimant; (b) under Section 4(a)(2) or 5(a), within 4 years after the transfer was 
made or the obligation was incurred . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
31
 See, e.g., In re Dolata, 306 B.R. 97, 115 (W.D. Penn. 2007) (comparing 
Section 548(a)(1) with Pennsylvania’s fraudulent transfer statute and noting that they 
are “expressly distinguishable” in that “transfers that may be subject to attack under 
§ 548(a)(1) are limited to those that are made within one year [now two years] of the 
date of a debtor's bankruptcy petition filing, whereas a transfer generally remains 
assailable under [Pennsylvania’s statute] provided that an avoidance action is 
brought thereunder within four years of such transfer . . . .”) (internal citations 
omitted). 
32
 See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 69 (1999); Charles 
Alan Wright, et al., 14 FED. PRAC. & PROC. JURIS. § 3654 (3d ed.) (“It now is well 
settled by numerous judicial precedents—although for a century the rule was stated 
only in dicta—that the United States may not be sued without its consent.”) 
33




Geske: Seventh Circuit Holds That Bankruptcy Trustee's "Strong-Arm" Powe
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2014
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                        Volume 10, Issue 1                            Fall 2014 
 
8 
inherited this principle from English common law at the time of the 
nation’s founding.
35
 The United States Supreme Court has observed 
that “[w]hen the Constitution was ratified, it was well established in 
English law that the Crown could not be sued without consent in its 
courts.”
36
 At present, the prevailing view on the Supreme Court is that 
the framers understood and accepted sovereign immunity, and that it is 
implicit in the framework of the Constitution.
37
 
Sovereign immunity operates to deprive a court of subject matter 
jurisdiction over the suit unless the sovereign consents to be sued.
38
 
Generally, only Congress can consent to, waive, or abrogate the 
federal government’s sovereign immunity.
39
 Where Congress 
abrogates sovereign immunity through a legislative act, it must do so 
explicitly and unequivocally.
40
 Waivers are strictly construed, and any 
ambiguity as to the waiver is construed in favor of the sovereign.
41
 
In the past, the states and the federal government invoked 
sovereign immunity as a bar against actions brought by debtors and 
                                                 
35
 Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715-16 (1999) (“Although the American 
people had rejected other aspects of English political theory, the doctrine that a 
sovereign could not be sued without its consent was universal in the States when the 
Constitution was drafted and ratified.” (citing Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419, 




 Id.  
38
 Charles Alan Wright, et al., 14 FED. PRAC. & PROC. JURIS. § 3654 (3d ed.) 
(“The natural consequence of the sovereign immunity principle is that the absence of 
consent by the United States is a fundamental defect that deprives the district court 
of subject matter jurisdiction.”). 
39
 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 106.01 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer 
eds.,16th ed. 2014) (“[F]ederal and state governmental bodies enjoy sovereign 
immunity from suit except when their immunity has been abrogated by Congress, 
waived by some action taken by the governmental body or eliminated by a specific 
provision of the Constitution itself.”); U.S. v. Nordic Vill., Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 33-34 
(1992). 
40
 Nordic Vill., 503 U.S. at 33-34. 
41
 Id. at 34 (“the Government's consent to be sued ‘must be construed strictly in 
favor of the sovereign, and not enlarge[d] . . . beyond what the language requires’”) 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
8
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 However, the Bankruptcy Code now contains an explicit 
abrogation of sovereign immunity in Section 106.
43
 This section went 
into effect with the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, which amended 
Section 106 to its current form.
 44
 Section 106 now explicitly 
enumerates each section of the Bankruptcy Code for which the 
abrogation applies.
45
 Section 106(a)(1) states, in relevant part, 
“Notwithstanding an assertion of sovereign immunity, sovereign 
immunity is abrogated as to a governmental unit to the extent set forth 
in this section with respect to . . . [s]ection[] . . . 544 of this title.”
46
 
Section 106(a)(2) gives courts the power to “hear and determine any 
issue arising with respect to the application of such section[] to 
governmental units.”
47
 The phrase “governmental unit” is a defined 
term under the Code, broadly including all federal, state, and local 
government entities.
48
 And Section 106(a)(3) provides that “[t]he court 
may issue against a governmental unit an order, process, or judgment 
under such sections or the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, 
including an order or judgment awarding a money recovery, but not 
including an award of punitive damages.”
49
 
According to the House Reports and legislative history for Section 
106,
50
 Congress enacted Section 106 because the statute that preceded 
                                                 
42
 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 106.01. 
43
 11 U.S.C.A. 106(a) (West 2014). 
44
 Pub.L. No. 103–394, § 113, 108 Stat. 4106 (1994). 
45




 Id. § 106(a)(2). 
48
 Id. § 101(27) (“The term ‘governmental unit’ means United States; State; 
Commonwealth; District; Territory; municipality; foreign state; department, agency, 
or instrumentality of the United States (but not a United States trustee while serving 
as a trustee in a case under this title), a State, a Commonwealth, a District, a 
Territory, a municipality, or a foreign state; or other foreign or domestic 
government.”). 
49
 Id. § 106(a)(3). 
50
 H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 317 (1977), reprinted in App. Pt. 
4(d)(i); S. Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 29-30 (1978). 
9
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10 
it failed to unambiguously abrogate sovereign immunity.
51
 In Hoffman 
v. Connecticut Department of Income Maintenance and United States 
v. Nordic Village, Inc., the Supreme Court held that Section 106’s 
predecessor failed to successfully abrogate sovereign immunity, 
because its language was not sufficiently explicit.
 52
 However, 
following the 1994 amendments, there is now no disagreement; 
Section 106 unambiguously abrogates sovereign immunity as to the 




B. Prior Court Decisions Addressing the Issue 
 
While the Seventh Circuit was the first federal circuit court of 
appeals to consider the issue of whether a trustee can use Section 
544(b) to avoid fraudulent transfers to the federal government,
54
 it was 
not the first court to do so. A number of district courts have also 
passed on the issue. In re C.F. Foods, L.P.
55
 is the first and one of the 
most frequently cited of such cases. In C.F. Foods, two partners 
formed a Pennsylvania limited partnership for the purpose of engaging 
in business as a candy wholesaler.
56
 The partners solicited 
investments, promising returns of eighteen to thirty percent.
57
 In 
reality, the business was a vehicle for fraud. In 1988 the business 
reported that it had $140 million in sales even though it actually had 
                                                 
51
 WILLIAM L. NORTON, NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW & PRACTICE § 14:4 (3d 
ed.) (“The Committee Report points out that the amendment was intended to 
overrule both Hoffman v. Connecticut Dept. of Income Maintenance and U.S. v. 
Nordic Village Inc.”); 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 106. 
52
 See Hoffman v. Connecticut Dept. of Income Maint., 492 U.S. 96 (1989); 
U.S. v. Nordic Vill., Inc., 503 U.S. 30 (1992). 
53
 See supra note 51. 
54
 In re Equip. Acquisition Res., Inc., 742 F.3d 743, 748 (7th Cir. 2014) (“This 
is an issue of first impression for any circuit court of appeals.”). 
55
 Liebersohn v. IRS (In re C.F. Foods, L.P.), 265 B.R. 71 (Bankr. E.D. Penn. 
2001). 
56
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11 
only $5 million in revenue.
58
 In order to perpetuate and cover up the 
fraud, the partners recorded fake transactions and sales figures.
59
 
Based on the reported sales figures, the partners incurred federal 
personal income tax liability, and they used partnership assets to cover 
this liability.
60
 Between 1996 and 1998, the partnership made nine 
payments to the IRS for the partners’ benefit, totaling $3,190,259.38.
61
 
In May of 1999, C.F. Foods entered involuntary Chapter 7 
bankruptcy.
62
 The bankruptcy trustee subsequently filed an adversary 
proceeding against the IRS, seeking to recover the tax payments as 
fraudulent transfers.
63
 The trustee asserted that the transfers were 
fraudulent under Pennsylvania’s Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act,
64
 
which the trustee invoked through Section 544(b).
65
 In response, the 
IRS took the position that it was immune from the avoidance claim 
due to sovereign immunity.
66
 The IRS argued that outside of 
bankruptcy, unsecured creditors would be barred by sovereign 
immunity from asserting state law avoidance claims against the federal 
government; and because the trustee steps into the shoes of a state law 
creditor, the trustee should be similarly barred from bringing a claim 
under Section 544 and Pennsylvania’s fraudulent transfer act.
67
 Put 
differently, the IRS contended that Congress had not made the 
necessary explicit waiver of sovereign immunity as to any state 
fraudulent transfer statutes—Section 106(a) only applied to the 
Bankruptcy Code and not state law, and as a result, the trustee should 
be barred from asserting the avoidance claim.
68
 
                                                 
58






 Id. at 75 n.4. 
62
 Id. at 73. 
63
 Id. at 74. 
64
 12 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5101, et seq. (West 2014). 
65
 C.F. Foods, 265 B.R. at 77. 
66
 Id. at 81. 
67
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12 
Although the court thought there was some “allure” to the IRS’s 
argument, it ultimately held in favor of the trustee.
69
 After examining 
the legislative history of Section 106, the court found that Congress 
had unequivocally asserted its power to abrogate the federal 
government’s sovereign immunity from actions brought under Section 
544.
70
 This abrogation also covered state law causes of action 
subsumed by Section 544(b).
71
 The Court reasoned that “[b]y 
including § 544 in the list of Bankruptcy Code sections set forth in § 
106(a), Congress knowingly included state law causes of action within 
the category of suits to which a sovereign immunity defense could no 
longer be asserted.”
72
 This reading of 106(a) was correct, said the 
court, in light of the statute’s “unambiguous language.”
73
 The court 
conceded that its decision resulted in some incongruity by giving the 
trustee greater rights in bankruptcy than a creditor would have outside 
of bankruptcy.
74
 But, as the court observed, this result was consistent 
with the broad rights possessed by the trustee by virtue of Section 
544.
75
 Further, the court also justified its decision on policy grounds, 
noting that any recovery of assets for the bankruptcy estate benefits all 
of the debtor’s creditors as a whole.
76
  
In addition to C.F. Foods, several other district courts have 
considered this issue prior to Equipment Acquisition Resources, and 
each court’s decision falls in line with the C.F. Foods holding. For 
example, In re Custom Contractors, LLC also involved a trustee’s 
                                                 
69






 Id. at 85. 
73
 Id. at 86. 
74




 Id. (“even if there was any ambiguity to § 106(a)—and I find that there is 
none—other considerations still weigh heavily against the result sought by the IRS. 
Any recovery by the bankruptcy trustee will benefit all of the debtor's creditors, 
including the IRS.”). 
12
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13 
complaint to avoid and recover transfers from the debtor to the IRS.
77
 
The complaint alleged that the debtor, a limited liability company, had 
transferred $199,956.25 to the IRS on behalf of one of its principals.
78
 
The company made the transfer to satisfy the principal’s personal 
income tax liability at a time when he was struggling to pay his own 
bills, even though the company owed the principal no money.
79
 
The bankruptcy trustee in Custom Contractors sought to avoid the 
transfers through Section 544(b)(1) and the Florida Uniform 
Fraudulent Transfer Act (FUFTA).
80
 The IRS then moved to dismiss, 
raising the same argument that it had in C.F. Foods—that the trustee 
could not avoid the transfers because no creditor outside of bankruptcy 
could bring a state law claim against the IRS under the FUFTA due to 
sovereign immunity.
81
 The court again rejected the IRS’s argument.
82
 
Citing to C.F. Foods, the court held that the “unambiguous language of 
§ 106” abrogated the federal government’s sovereign immunity as to 
state fraudulent transfer laws invoked pursuant to the trustee’s strong-
arm powers.
83
 The court reasoned that a contrary reading of the statute 
“requir[ing] a trustee to demonstrate that the United States has waived 
sovereign immunity in every instance the trustee seeks to rely on state 
law for the purpose of § 544 would render the general abrogation of 
sovereign immunity under § 106 almost meaningless.”
84
 
Another case following the lead of C.F. Foods and Custom 
Contractors is In re DBSI, Inc.
85
 As in the cases discussed above, the 
bankruptcy trustee brought a Section 544(b) claim to avoid and 
                                                 
77
 Menotte v. U.S. (In re Custom Contractors, LLC), 439 B.R. 544, 545 
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2010). 
78




 Id. at 546; FLA. STAT. ANN. 726.105, et seq. (West 2014). 
81
 Custom Contractors, 439 B.R. at 546-47. 
82
 Id. at 549. 
83
 Id. at 548-49. 
84
 Id. at 549 (emphasis added). 
85
 Zazzali v. Swenson (In re DBSI, Inc.), No. 10-54649(PJW), 2011 WL 
607442 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011). 
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recover transfers that the debtor made to the IRS on behalf of the 
company’s insiders, and the IRS moved to dismiss the claim on 
sovereign immunity grounds.
86
 Here again, the IRS emphasized the 
actual creditor requirement of Section 544(b), and argued that a 
creditor could not bring an avoidance action against the IRS because 
Congress had not explicitly waived sovereign immunity as to the 
state’s fraudulent transfer statute.
87
  
Again, the court sided with the trustee, citing approvingly to C.F. 
Foods and Custom Contractors and finding their reasoning 
persuasive.
88
 The court looked at the interaction between Sections 106 
and 544, and found that “[i]nterpreting § 106(a)(1) to include an 
abrogation of the applicable nonbankruptcy causes of action available 
to a trustee under § 544(b)(1) comports with the purpose and use of 
that provision.”
89
 The court underscored two reasons that formed the 
basis of its holding. First, there is a “long history of empowering 
bankruptcy trustees to bring certain state law causes of action,” and 
Congress would have been aware of this history when it enacted 
Section 106 and abrogated sovereign immunity as to Section 544.
90
 It 
follows, therefore, that when Congress enacted Section 106 it intended 
to abrogate sovereign immunity as to state law avoidance actions 
brought under Section 544.
91
 
Second, the court found that the IRS’s reading of Section 106 was 
problematic because it “would render § 106 practically 
meaningless.”
92
 The court explained: 
 
[According to the IRS], Congress’ abrogation of sovereign 
immunity as to § 544 is only one part of the equation . . . 
[T]here must also be a waiver or abrogation of sovereign 
                                                 
86
 Id. at *1. 
87
 Id. at *3. 
88
 Id. at *4. 
89
 Id. at *5. 
90
 Id. at *4. 
91
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immunity with respect to the particular “applicable law” . . . . 
However, neither [this state’s] legislature nor any state would 
have authority to abrogate the sovereign immunity of the 
United States as a defense to a creditor claim under the state's 
version of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act or otherwise. 
Thus, the IRS’ argument would apparently render 





Put differently, accepting the IRS’s argument would mean introducing 
a second hurdle of sovereign immunity, requiring another act of 
abrogation or waiver in addition to Section 106.
94
 The court reasoned 
that this outcome was undesirable, because it would render Section 
106 ineffective as to Section 544(b) without some extra act abrogating 
sovereign immunity for state laws.
95
 
The line of cases that began with C.F. Foods continued unbroken 
through the end of 2013 with In re Valley Mortgage, Inc.
96
 In Valley 
Mortgage, the debtor was a corporation used to perpetrate a massive 
Ponzi scheme.
97
 Between 2005 and 2007, the debtor’s president and 
majority owner wrote eight checks totaling $161,341.40 to the U.S. 
treasury to cover his personal income taxes.
98
 After the Ponzi scheme 
came to light, the corporation went into receivership and filed for 
bankruptcy.
99
 Once in bankruptcy, the debtor in possession sought to 
avoid the checks to the IRS as fraudulent transfers.
100
 Because the last 
                                                 
93
 Id. (quoting Sharp v. U.S. (In re SK Foods, L.P.), No. 09–29162–D–11, 






 VMI Liquidating Trust Dated December 16, 2011 v. U.S. ex rel. IRS (In re 









 Id. at *2 (“Here, the Debtor filed for bankruptcy on April 19, 2010. The last 
transfer in question to the Defendant occurred in July of 2007. Thus, all of the 
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of the transfers occurred in 2007, more than two years prior to 
bankruptcy, Section 544(b) was the only viable means for 
avoidance.
101
 The debtor therefore invoked the Colorado Uniform 
Fraudulent Transfer Act
102




 The IRS raised a sovereign immunity defense,
 104
 and once again 
the court rejected it.
105
 The court held that the waiver of sovereign 
immunity in Section 106(a) applied to Section 544(b) “regardless of 
whether the application of 544(b)(1) is predicated on a state law cause 
of action . . . .”
106
 In construing Sections 106 and 544 together, the 
court reasoned that it would be improper to exclude 544(b) from 
Congress’ waiver of sovereign immunity as to all of Section 544: 
 
Congress chose to explicitly waive sovereign immunity with 
respect to the entirety of section 544. . . . If Congress 
intended to retain a sovereign immunity defense to actions 
brought under section 544(b)(1), Congress certainly could 
have done so. This Court refuses to read into section 106(a) 
an exclusion to the waiver of sovereign immunity which 
Congress did not specifically provide. To do so would be 
                                                                                                                   
alleged fraudulent transfers to the Defendant occurred more than two years prior to 
the Debtor's bankruptcy petition and are therefore outside of [Section 548’s] statute 
of limitations.”). 
101
 Id. at *4 (“[I]n order for the Debtor to assert a timely claim to recover 
alleged fraudulent transfers, it must rely on [the state fraudulent transfer law’s] 
longer statute of limitations because the limitations period in section 548 of the Code 
has expired.”). 
102
 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-8-101, et seq. (West 2014). 
103
 Valley Mortgage, 2013 WL 5314369, at *4. 
104
 Id. (“the [IRS] argues that if sovereign immunity prohibits an unsecured 
creditor from bringing a non-bankruptcy state law claim against the Defendant, then 
sovereign immunity similarly prohibits a trustee who steps into the shoes of an 
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improper and result in a judicially created amendment to an 




The Court also noted that its decision was in line with “numerous 
other courts” that had also held that the waiver of sovereign immunity 




The cases discussed above are representative of an unbroken 
chain of court decisions from C.F. Foods in 2001 through Valley 
Mortgage in 2013. These cases illustrate the persuasive legal 
arguments and reasoning that motivated the court in each case to 
follow the lead of the C.F. Foods position. C.F. Foods, Valley 
Mortgage, and all the cases decided in between are consistent, and the 
courts’ opinions are cogent. In each case, the court relied on classic 
techniques of statutory interpretation, starting with language of the 
statutes,
109
 and construing it in a way that harmonized with Congress’ 
intent and the Bankruptcy Code as a whole. Nonetheless, the Seventh 
Circuit found reason to part ways with this line of cases. 
 
II. CASE BACKGROUND 
 
Before discussing the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Equipment 
Acquisition Resources in Part III below, this Part provides the factual 
and procedural background underlying the court’s decision. This Part 
begins by setting forth the facts that led up to the suit, followed by a 




 Id. Interestingly, one of the decisions the court cited to was the U.S. District 
Court for the Northern District of Illinois’s opinion in United States v. Equipment 
Acquisition Resources, Inc. (In re Equip. Acquisition Res., Inc.), 485 B.R. 586 (N.D. 
Ill. 2013), rev’d, In re Equip. Acquisition Res., Inc., 742 F.3d 743 (7th Cir. 2014), 
which was reported prior to the appeal of that case to the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit. At the time of Valley Mortgage, the Northern District’s decision 
had not yet been reversed, and it fell in line with C.F. Foods and its progeny. 
109
 See generally U.S. v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989) 
(“The task of resolving the dispute over the meaning of [a statute] begins where all 
such inquiries must begin: with the language of the statute itself.”). 
17
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brief discussion of the case’s disposition in the bankruptcy court and 
district court prior to appeal to the Seventh Circuit. 
 
A. Factual & Procedural Background 
 
 The debtor who initiated the bankruptcy proceedings was a 
corporation named Equipment Acquisition Resources, Inc. (EAR).
110
 
EAR was organized as an S-corporation
111
 under the laws of Illinois, 
and engaged in the business of semiconductor manufacturing 
equipment sales and servicing.
112
 In the years leading up to 
bankruptcy, EAR, through its officers and agents, engaged in what 
would later be described in pleadings as a “massive fraud.”
113
 EAR 
allegedly sold equipment at inflated prices, then leased the equipment 
back, misrepresented the value of the equipment, and pledged the 




After the fraud was exposed, EAR’s shareholders elected one 
person to act as the sole director of EAR’s board and simultaneously 
serve as the company’s chief restructuring officer.
115
 The restructuring 
officer filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy on October 23, 2009.
116
 Post-
filing, the restructuring officer conducted an investigation and 
                                                 
110
 In re Equip. Acquisition Res., Inc., 742 F.3d 743, 744-45 (7th Cir. 2014). 
111
 Because EAR was organized as an S-corp., corporate income passed 
through to the owners who then reported that income on their individual tax returns. 
Id. (“Subchapter S corporations do not pay taxes on corporate income; instead, the 
tax liability is passed through to the corporation's shareholders.”); see generally 
MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 496 (8th ed. 2000) (“Under flow-through taxation, a firm is 
not subject to taxation. Instead, all of the firm’s income and expenses, and gains and 
losses, are taxable directly to the firm’s owners. Distributions are not taxed.”). 
112
 Equip. Acquisition Res., Inc. v. U.S. (In re Equip. Acquisition Res., Inc.), 
451 B.R. 454, 457 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2011), rev’d, In re Equip. Acquisition Res., Inc., 
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discovered that, during the lead-up to bankruptcy, between October 15, 
2007 and December 3, 2008, EAR made nine transfers to the IRS 
totaling $4,737,261.36.
117
 EAR had apparently made these payments 
on behalf of its shareholders in order to cover the shareholders’ 




Now in bankruptcy, EAR, acting as debtor in possession, sought 
to avoid the payments as constructively fraudulent transfers and 
recover the funds.
119
 On January 20, 2010, EAR initiated an adversary 
proceeding with the filing of a complaint against the United States.
120
 
EAR subsequently amended its complaint to also include the 
shareholders as defendants.
121
 Of the nine tax payments, eight 
occurred within a two-year period prior to the filing of the bankruptcy 
petition.
122
 EAR sought to avoid these pursuant to the bankruptcy 
avoidance powers in Section 548.
123
 As to these payments, EAR and 
the IRS eventually reached a settlement, under which the IRS agreed 
to disgorge the payments.
124
 The ninth payment, however, was the real 




 When companies offer to pay their principals’ income taxes as an additional 
form of compensation,  
 
“the IRS finds itself in the position of defendant in a fraudulent transfer action. 
If an S corporation, which ordinarily owes no income taxes, pays the income 
taxes for its shareholders, the S corporation arguably receives no value for this 
payment. If at the time of such payments, the S corporation was insolvent, 
undercapitalized, or knew it will incur debts beyond its ability to pay when 
such debts come due, and the S corporation ends up in bankruptcy, the 
payments may be challenged as constructive fraudulent transfers, both under 
the Bankruptcy Code and under state law . . . .”  
Alec P. Ostrow, Taxes and Transfers and Trusts, 2014 NORTON ANN. SURV. 
BANKR. L. 2 (2014).  
119










 Id. at 458. 
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source of contention between the parties. This payment had occurred 
more than two years prior to bankruptcy. So, EAR could only avoid 
the transfer through Section 544(b), which gave EAR access to state 
fraudulent transfer law, here the Illinois Uniform Fraudulent Transfer 
Act,
125
 and that law’s longer reach-back period.
126
 
 The IRS filed its answer on January 13, 2011 and raised ten 
defenses.
127
 In response to EAR’s Section 544(b) claim, the IRS raised 
the defense of sovereign immunity, taking the familiar position that an 
actual creditor bringing a claim outside of bankruptcy would not be 
able to avoid a transfer to the IRS using the Illinois Uniform 




B. Disposition in the Lower Courts 
 
The bankruptcy court described the issue as hinging on the 
interplay between Sections 544 and 106, and undertook a thorough 
statutory interpretation inquiry, examining the language of Section 
106.
129
 In construing the statute, the court acknowledged that it was 
not the first court to confront this issue.
130
 Indeed, the opinion quotes 
heavily from the courts’ decisions in C.F. Foods and Custom 
Contractors, and cites to their progeny, such as DBSI among others.
131
 
Ultimately, the bankruptcy court found that “[t]he plain language of § 
106(a)(1) is clear, precise, unambiguous, and straightforward,” and 
that “when it abrogated sovereign immunity as to § 544 causes of 
action, Congress intended to include those state law causes of action 
available under § 544(b)(1).”
132
 Accordingly, the court denied the 
                                                 
125
 744 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 160/5(a)(2) (West 2014). 
126
 Equip. Acquisition Res., 451 B.R. at 461. 
127
 Id. at 457. 
128
 Id. at 458. 
129
 Id. at 461-63. 
130
 Id. at 463. 
131
 Id. at 463-65. 
132
 Id. at 468. 
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IRS’s motion to dismiss, and ordered the United States to pay back a 
portion of the fraudulently transferred funds.
133
 
The IRS appealed to the U.S. District Court for the Northern 
District of Illinois, arguing that the bankruptcy court erred and that the 
district court should vacate the order requiring the United States to 
return the funds.
134
 The district court framed the issue as whether the 
limits of Section 544(b) prevented avoidance notwithstanding the 
abrogation of sovereign immunity in Section 106.
135
 In siding with 
EAR and affirming the bankruptcy court’s holding, the district court 
broadly held that “106(a)(1) simply eliminates the obstacle [of 
sovereign immunity] wherever it appears ‘with respect to’ § 544.”
136
 
Like prior courts, the Northern District court held that the IRS’s 
sovereign immunity defense failed when put up against the “plain 




III. DISCUSSION OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S OPINION IN EQUIPMENT 
ACQUISITION RESOURCES 
 
Although Equipment Acquisition Resources was a case of first 
impression for the Seventh Circuit, the court did not consider the case 
on a blank slate. As shown in Part I, there was already a significant 
body of case law when the case reached the Seventh Circuit.
138
 This 
Part examines how the Seventh Circuit interpreted Sections 106 and 
544 and decided Equipment Acquisition Resources in light of the 
existing case law. 
 
 




 U.S. v. Equip. Acquisition Res., Inc. (In re Equip. Acquisition Res., Inc.), 
485 B.R. 586, 591 (N.D. Ill. 2013), rev’d, In re Equip. Acquisition Res., Inc., 742 
F.3d 743 (7th Cir. 2014). 
135
 Id. at 592. 
136




 See supra, Part I.B. 
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A. Seventh Circuit’s Decision 
 
Judge Flaum authored the Seventh Circuit’s opinion.
139
 The 
opinion begins by examining the nature of Section 544 avoidance 
actions, and focusing on the provision’s limits.
140
 The court 
emphasized that the trustee’s strong-arm powers are circumscribed by 
the confines of state law and the actual creditor requirement.
141
 First, 
the court stated the legal standard for the “actual shoes” restriction, 
reinforcing that the bankruptcy trustee’s strong-arm powers are 
“derivative of state law,” and the trustee can only do in bankruptcy 
“what a creditor would have been able to do outside of bankruptcy.”
142
 
Second, the court called attention to the actual creditor requirement: 
“If there are no creditors against whom the transfer is voidable under 
the applicable law, the trustee is powerless to act under section 
544(b)(1).”
143
 Since these two restrictions exist simultaneously, said 
the court, “if the actual creditor could not succeed for any reason . . . 
then the trustee is similarly barred and cannot avoid the transfer.”
144
 
The Seventh Circuit’s opinion then proceeded to the substantive 
merits of EAR’s claim, and it is here that the court parted ways with 
the lower courts and prior case law. The court reasoned that EAR’s 
claim failed due to the limits inherent in Section 544 itself, despite 
106(a)’s explicit abrogation of sovereign immunity.
145
 More 
specifically, the court held that EAR could not even satisfy the actual 
creditor requirement of Section 544(b), which “by its very terms, 
requires EAR to show that a creditor exists who could use a state’s 
‘applicable law’ to recover the payment from the IRS.”
146
 The court 
                                                 
139
 In re Equip. Acquisition Res., Inc., 742 F.3d 743, 744 (7th Cir. 2014). 
140






 Id. (quoting 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 544.06[1] (Alan N. Resnick & 








Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 2
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol10/iss1/2
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                        Volume 10, Issue 1                            Fall 2014 
 
23 
found that “there is no question that no [such] creditor exists in this 
case . . . [A]n unsecured creditor would have been barred [by 
sovereign immunity] from bringing an Illinois fraudulent-transfer 
action against the IRS outside of bankruptcy.”
147
 An argument that 
focuses on Section 106(a) instead of 544 “misses the point,” said the 
court.
148
 Rather, “[n]othing in § 106(a)(1) gives the trustee greater 
rights to avoid transfers than the unsecured creditor would have under 
state law. By concluding that § 106(a)(1) did just that, the courts below 
erred.”
149
 In short, the court rested its decision not on whether 
Congress had successfully abrogated sovereign immunity in Section 
106(a), but on the “unambiguous language” of § 544(b).
150
 
The court further stated that EAR would fail to satisfy the actual 
creditor requirement of Section 544(b) for other reasons, even if there 
were no sovereign immunity questions.
151
 The court reasoned that 
certain clauses of the U.S. Constitution pose other significant obstacles 
to recovering money from the federal government.
152
 Specifically, the 
Appropriations Clause in Article I Section 9 states that “No Money 
shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of 
Appropriations made by Law . . . .”
153
 Courts have read this clause to 
“mean[] simply that no money can be paid out of the Treasury unless it 
has been appropriated by an act of Congress.”
154
 Therefore, the court 
stated, sovereign immunity issues notwithstanding, this clause would 
prevent a creditor from using a state law to recover money from the 
federal government; absent an act of Congress, the recovery payment 
would violate the Appropriations Clause.
155
 Similarly, the court held 






 Id. at 748. 
150
 Id. at 749. 
151
 Id. at 747-48. 
152
 Id. at 748. 
153
 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7. 
154
 Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 424 (1990). 
155
 Equip. Acquisition Res., 742 F.3d at 748 (“states cannot enforce their laws 
so as to retrieve money from the federal coffers . . . .”). 
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that the Supremacy Clause is yet another barrier.
156
 Under this clause, 
the Constitution and federal law is “the supreme law of the land,” and 
the states may not tax the federal government or empower their 
citizens to recover federal taxes.
157
 For these reasons, said the Seventh 
Circuit, it would be unconstitutional for a state law creditor to recover 
tax payments from the federal government.
158
  
The Seventh Circuit also justified its decision on policy 
grounds.
159
 The court speculated that allowing recovery against the 
IRS might make federal agencies more vulnerable to state-law-based 
recovery actions.
160
 State legislatures could loosen the requirements 
for avoidance under state law, which would allow recovery against the 
IRS in various unforeseen situations.
161
 This result would be contrary 
to the IRS’s interest in financial stability.
162
 Additionally, the court 
observed that in cases where there is ambiguity as to whether 
Congress intended to waive sovereign immunity, the ambiguity should 
                                                 
156
 The Supremacy Clause of Article IV states: 
 
“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in 
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the 
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the 
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or 
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”  
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
157
 See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (“[S]tates have 
no power, by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden, or in any manner 
control, the operations of the constitutional laws enacted by congress to carry into 
execution the powers vested in the general government.”). 
158
 Equip. Acquisition Res., 742 F.3d at 748. 
159




 Id. (“state legislatures could relax the criteria for what constitutes a 
fraudulent transfer, rendering federal tax revenue even more vulnerable to 
unexpected recovery actions.”). 
162
 Id. (quoting United States v. Clintwood Elkhorn Mining Co., 553 U.S. 1, 12 
(2008)). 
24
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be construed in favor of the sovereign.
163
 In other words, “when it 
comes to sovereign immunity ties go to the government.”
164
 
For these reasons, the Seventh Circuit found that EAR could not 
satisfy the actual creditor requirement of Section 544(b).
165
 And as a 
consequence of the court’s holding, there is no state law creditor that 
can possibly satisfy the Section 544(b) actual creditor requirement in 
cases where the federal government is the transferee. Simply put, there 
are no shoes into which the trustee or debtor in possession can step.  
 
B. The Seventh Circuit’s Response to C.F. Foods 
 
In its opinion, the Seventh Circuit also addressed C.F. Foods and 
its progeny, acknowledging that its decision “diverge[d] from all of the 
bankruptcy and district courts to consider the issue in the context of 
the federal government.”
166
 The Seventh Circuit stated that those prior 
cases erred by focusing too heavily on Section 106 and neglecting the 
actual creditor requirement of 544(b).
167
  
The court also responded to some of the individual points relied 
on in prior opinions. For example, recall that C.F. Foods and other 
courts reasoned that disallowing avoidance would render 106(a) 
meaningless as to Section 544(b).
168
 The Seventh Circuit disagreed, 
stating that Section 106(a) would still be applicable to 544(a), even if 
inapplicable to 544(b).
169
 Unlike Section 544(b), 544(a) has no actual 
creditor requirement; so a court considering a Section 544(a) claim 
would not be concerned with whether an actual creditor could avoid a 
transfer or would otherwise be barred by sovereign immunity.
170
 The 
court’s position here draws some support from the fact that all the 






 Id. at 750-51. 
166
 Id. at 748. 
167
 Id. at 748-49. 
168
 See supra Part I.B. 
169
 Equip. Acquisition Res., 742 F.3d at 749. 
170
 Id.; compare 11 U.S.C.A. § 544(b) (West 2014) with § 544(a). 
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sections named in 106(a) are referenced generally, according to their 
section number, without any sign as to whether abrogation is limited to 
particular lettered subsections.
171
 It would be strange, the court 
reasoned, to expect Congress to specify that 106(a) applies only to 
544(a) and not 544(b), when none of the other sections listed in 106(a) 
are that specific.
172
 It is therefore at least possible that Congress 
intended to abrogate sovereign immunity only as to Section 544(a) and 
not all of Section 544.
173
 
Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit surmised that, after its holding, 
there would still be situations where the abrogation in 106(a) would 
apply to 544(b).
174
 Specifically, the waiver of sovereign immunity 
might be meaningful in cases where the trustee seeks to recover a tax 
payment from the debtor to a state or local governmental unit.
175
 In 
that situation, if the state waived or abrogated its own sovereign 
immunity to suits in state court, then 544(b) would allow the trustee to 




The court rejected prior courts’ reliance on Congress’ intent and 
the legislative history.
177
 History and intent cannot overcome the 
“unambiguous language” of Section 544, said the Seventh Circuit.
178
 
The Seventh Circuit also questioned the C.F. Foods court’s reading of 
the legislative history. The House Report showed that Congress 
                                                 
171
 Equip. Acquisition Res., 742 F.3d at 749 (“All of the fifty-nine provisions 
listed in § 106(a)(1) cite to a Code provision generally, without listing particular 
subsections. Yet, as the United States correctly points out, many of the listed 
provisions have subsections that do not implicate sovereign immunity. We believe 
the better conclusion is that Congress simply listed undivided Code sections if any 
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amended Section 106 to make it more clear and unambiguous.
179
 But, 
according to the Seventh Circuit, assuring that the Bankruptcy Code 
successfully abrogates sovereign immunity is a separate question, 
unrelated to the issue of whether the trustee can satisfy the actual 






As compared to the outcome in Equipment Acquisition Resources, 
the holdings in C.F. Foods and its progeny are better at reconciling the 
Bankruptcy Code, promoting bankruptcy policy, and honoring 
Congress’ intent underlying Section 106. Accordingly, I argue that 
Equipment Acquisition Resources should be overruled and other courts 
should not look to it for guidance. 
The Seventh Circuit’s faith in the supposed plain and 
unambiguous meaning of Section 544 is misplaced. Many of the other 
courts that considered this same issue prior to Equipment Acquisition 
Resources also purported to rely on the plain meaning of Sections 544 
and 106.
181
 Therefore, it is possible, if not likely, for different courts to 
reach opposite outcomes while professing to interpret a law’s plain 
meaning and merely apply it to the facts.
182
 As one court remarked, 
                                                 
179




 See supra Part I.B. 
182
 For other cases questioning the value of a plain meaning approach in 
situations where there is disagreement over a statute’s interpretation, see, for 
example, In re Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC, 422 B.R. 553, 565 (Bankr. E.D. 
Penn. 2010) (observing that “five bankruptcy courts have now addressed th[is] issue 
and they are sharply divided. In four decisions courts have expressly based their 
ruling on the ‘plain meaning’ of the text of [this Rule] but have evenly split on that 
‘plain meaning.’”); In re Turner, 384 B.R. 537, 540 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 2008), rev’d, 
574 F.3d 349 (7th Cir. 2009) (“Bankruptcy courts have reached conflicting 
conclusions as to the ‘plain meaning’ of § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii).”); In re Curry, 362 B.R. 
394, 397 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2007) (“[I]t is difficult to see how recognition that [the 
statute] ‘is susceptible to conflicting interpretations,’ can nonetheless lead to a 
conclusion that any ultimate interpretation is ‘supported by the plain meaning . . . .’” 
(internal citations omitted)). 
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“like beauty, clarity is often in the eye of the beholder.”
183
 The 
problem here is in the Seventh’s Circuit’s heavy reliance on the plain 
meaning approach at the expense of other sources of meaning. If a 
statute’s meaning is actually patent, then a single outcome would be 
inevitable. Instead, where judges reach different and conflicting 
interpretations, the only conclusion is that the meaning is not actually 
plain. 
In Equipment Acquisition Resources, the interaction between 
Sections 544 and 106 is not plain. The Seventh Circuit focused on the 
actual creditor requirement of Section 544(b), and found that a creditor 
would be barred by sovereign immunity from avoiding a transfer to 
the government notwithstanding Section 106.
184
 Conversely, C.F. 
Foods and others reasoned that even if a creditor acting under state 
law would be barred by sovereign immunity, that bar disappears in the 
world of bankruptcy.
185
 The answer to this issue is not simple, and 
courts may need to look beyond the statute’s language to other sources 
of meaning, such as the statute’s purpose and Congress’ intent. It is too 
facile for a court to imply that a solution is clear or obvious when 
qualified judges acting in good faith come to different conclusions. 
Heavy reliance on a statute’s language may also cause judges to 
give short shrift to Congress’ intent and a statute’s purpose. As to 
Section 106, the legislative history and House Reports show that 
Congress specifically amended the statute to more explicitly and 
unambiguously abrogate sovereign immunity after two Supreme Court 
cases held that Section 106’s predecessor did not successfully abrogate 
sovereign immunity.
186
 The legislative history thus shows that 
Congress was careful to ensure that Section 106 successfully 
abrogated sovereign immunity as to the enumerated sections. Further, 
as the C.F. Foods court observed, the fact that Congress decided to 
                                                 
183
 Price v. Delaware State Police Federal Credit Union U.S. Trustee (In re 
Price), 370 F.3d 362, 368 (3d Cir. 2004) (observing that “notwithstanding their 
perception of a plain meaning, [] courts have arrived at polar opposite results”). 
184
 See supra notes 139, 145-150 and accompanying text. 
185
 See supra notes 55, 70-75 and accompanying text. 
186
 See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text. 
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29 
include Section 544 in subsection 106(a)(1) strongly suggests that 
Congress knew that it was including the strong-arm powers in the 
scope of the waiver. But because the Seventh Circuit focused more on 
the actual creditor requirement of Section 544, its holding ignores the 
significance of this legislative history.  
The Seventh Circuit’s approach also has the undesirable effect of 
creating disharmony in the Bankruptcy Code. The court’s holding 
renders Section 106(a) practically superfluous and inapplicable as to 
Section 544(b)—a critical source of the trustee’s power to avoid 
fraudulent transfers. Courts should avoid interpretations of statutes 
that create “surplusage.”
187
 As to this argument, the Seventh Circuit 
countered that 544(b) still has some application in cases involving 
transfers to state governments that have waived their own sovereign 
immunity.
188
 This point of view is plausible because 106(a) applies to 
any “governmental unit,” including state and local governments.
189
 
However, this interpretation creates an absurd result when the 
transferee is the federal government. As the court in DBSI pointed out, 
only Congress can waive the federal government’s sovereign 
immunity; thus the Seventh Circuit’s holding will require Congress to 
take the additional step of waiving sovereign immunity as to actions 
brought under each individual state’s fraudulent transfer act.
190
 
Equipment Acquisition Resources should be overruled for policy 
reasons as well. The Seventh Circuit noted that its holding furthered 
the policy of ensuring the IRS’s financial stability, because states 
might amend their fraudulent transfer statutes to make it too easy to 
                                                 
187
 See, e.g., U.S. v. Hernandez, 79 F.3d 584, 596 (7th Cir. 1996) (“[W]e 
recognize the time-honored rule that we are to avoid, if possible, a construction of a 
statute that renders any term surplusage.”); Washington Market Co. v. Hoffman, 101 
U.S. 112, 115-16 (1879) (“It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that 
significance and effect shall, if possible, be accorded to every word. . . . ‘a statute 
ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, 
sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.’ This rule has been 
repeated innumerable times.”). 
188
 See supra notes 171, 174-176 and accompanying text. 
189
 11 U.S.C.A. § 106(a)(1) (West 2014). 
190
 See supra notes 85, 92-95 and accompanying text. 
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avoid transfers to the IRS.
191
 However, at present this justification is 
entirely based on speculation. There is no indication that this is likely 
to happen, especially since most states have adopted the UFTA at the 
recommendation of the model act’s drafters.
192
 
Further, there is a strong bankruptcy policy in favor of promoting 
what is best for the debtor’s creditors as a whole, and ensuring that 
there is equity among them.
193
 Yet the Seventh Circuit’s holding favors 
one of a debtor’s creditors—the IRS—over all others. The cases in this 
article demonstrate that business-owners’ personal tax liability can be 
substantial when profits are large. However, the Seventh Circuit’s 
holding removes those assets from the bankruptcy estate and thus from 
the pot of money which is eventually distributed to the debtor’s 
creditors. Therefore, this holding is contrary to the two bankruptcy 
policies of maximizing the debtor’s estate and ensuring equity among 
creditors. For these reasons, courts should not follow Equipment 
Acquisition Resources and should instead adopt the reasoning of C.F. 




When the federal government becomes a target for avoidance, a 
conflict arises between Sections 106(a) and 544(b) of the Bankruptcy 
Code. Various courts, including the Seventh Circuit, have attempted to 
resolve this tension by relying on the Code provisions’ plain meaning. 
However, the differing court decisions on this issue demonstrate that 
the meaning of these statutes is not plain, and a resolution is not 
obvious. As such, this article asserts that courts should be willing to 
look to other sources of meaning, such as Congress’s intent and 
                                                 
 
191
 See supra notes 158, 160-162. 
192
 See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
193
 See, e.g., Graham v. Huntington Nat’l Bank (In re Medcorp, Inc.), 472 B.R. 
444, 450 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2012) (“The policy rationale of [avoidance] is to 
maximize the estate assets available to a debtor's general body of unsecured creditors 
. . . .”); First Union Nat’l Bank v. Gibbons (In re Matter of Princeton-N.Y. Investors, 
Inc.), 219 B.R. 55, 65-66 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1998) (discussing the bankruptcy goal for 
“the Trustee to maximize the bankruptcy estate for creditors' benefit . . . .”). 
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traditional bankruptcy policy. Following this approach, courts should 
hold that sovereign immunity is abrogated as to state law causes of 
action brought by the trustee under Section 544(b). This outcome 
better harmonizes the Bankruptcy Code, promotes bankruptcy policy, 
and honors Congress’s intent while staying within the boundaries of 
the statutes’ language. 
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